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ABSTRACT 
 
This note examines financial distributions to competing teams at the end of the most famous 
multiple stage professional (male) bicyclist race, "TOUR DE FRANCE". A rank-size law  
(RSL) is calculated for the team financial  gains. The RSL is found to be hyperbolic with a 
surprisingly simple decay exponent ≈-1. Yet, the financial gain distributions unexpectedly do 
not obey Pareto principle of factor sparsity.  Next, several (8) inequality indices are 
considered : the Entropy, the Hirschman-Herfindahl, Theil, Pietra-Hoover, Gini, Rosenbluth 
indices, the Coefficient of Variation and the Concentration Index are calculated for outlining 
« diversity measures ». The connection between such indices and their « concentration 
aspects » meanings are presented as support of the RSL  findings. The results emphasize that 
the sum of skills and team strategies are effectively contributing to the financial gains 
distributions. From theoretical and practical points of view, the findings suggest that one 
should investigate other "long multiple stage races" and rewarding rules. Indeed, money prize 
rules coupling to stage difficulty might influence and maybe enhance (or deteriorate) purely 
sportive aspects in group competitions. 
Due to the delay in the peer review process, the 2019  results can be examined. They are 
discussed in an Appendix ; the value of the exponent (-1.2) is pointed out to mainly 
originating from the so called « king effect » ; the tail of the RSL rather looks like an 
exponential. 
 
Keywords : Professional cyclist multistage races, Tour de France, Financial gains hierarchy, 
Financial indices, Rank-size Law 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Income, and more generally wealth, concentration is an old problem in finance and 
specifically in econometrics (Gini, 1921). Beside the Gini index, concentration ratios measure  
the percentage of market shares held by firms in some industry (Bikker and Haff, 2002; 
Marfels, 1972). Those measures have been used in many senses. it is proposed that they can 
be used in a somewhat generalization scheme in order to check wealth distributions  in 
communities, by analogy  with shares of banks on the financial market. This article aims at 
more specifically contributing to the science of professional sport economics management,  in 
an econophysics perspective, through a specific study, i.e. comparing financial gains of teams 
in sport competitions, considering how both endogenous and exogenous constraints  are 
influencing outcomes. 
 
On one hand,  rankings  are  ubiquitous  processes in human society, leading to 
defining hierarchies. Their illustrations through rank-size laws  (RSLs) are rather common in 
many cases: sociology, linguistics, lexicography, geography, biology, geophysics, physics, - 
and economy.  Many RSLs look like power laws. The most common one  is the Zipf's law 
(Zipf, 1949). There are many theoretical explanations for its existence.  They are related to the 
Pareto distributions (Newman,  2005). In brief, such explanations are often based on growth 
or decay processes, occurring in "self-organized systems" (Bak et al., 1988). 
 
On the other hand, empirical relationships between sport competition and economic 
aspects are parts of the framework in which one measures society's leisures. There is almost 
no need to recall that ranking is an essential feature of society, the more so in sport 
competitions, - looking like dynamical self-organizing system (McGarry, et al., 2002), highly 
tied to "financial rewards" or "money prizes".  Managing the prize money rules is an essential 
duty in order to enhance the competitive aspects, - and the interest of fans as well as that of 
sponsors and competitors. 
 
This reports aims at discussing ranking aspects of professional cyclist teams in a major 
(complex) competition, through a financial filter. One is finding an empirical but amazingly 
simple RSL for the aggregated financial  gains  of cycling teams in a multiple stage bicycle 
race, like the  "Tour de France".  The specificity of the competition and its financial 
complexity are further emphasized here below. It is shown that the Pareto (20/80) rule is not  
obeyed in this case, - unexpectedly. Moreover, the calculation of several financial indices 
serve as support to a discussion;  the theoretical and practical connections between such 
indices are outlined; their meaning is emphasized with respect to such unexpected findings on 
the rank-size law and concentration aspects.  Several indices emphasize the empirical role of 
the « best teams », others that of the « worst teams ». 
 
Like in for example soccer (Gasparetto & Barajas, 2018 ; Scelles et al., 2013),  
concentrating on the "best" teams, a « team value » can be measured through prize money 
which is  accrued  for the team based on the individual racers (ranking) performances, -  in 
different stages of a long (23 days) race. By investigating  data  over recent years, about the  
"Tour de France",  it is found that the distributions of  aggregated prize money follow an 
apparently universal power law, with a somewhat unexpected exponent having a « simple » 
value, nearly equal to -1. 
      
In order to understand the origin of this universal scaling RSL, one can focus on the 
financial gain distribution rules, and link the prize distribution to the Pareto principle of factor 
sparsity. However, it is found that the  financial gain distributions do  not obey the Pareto  
principle of factor sparsity.  Moreover, a structural break is found in  2016.  
   
Beside this so newly found RSL, several  (8) financial  coefficients, are  calculated in 
the following sections: the  concentration coefficient,  with the statistical entropy, Gini, Theil, 
Herfindahl–Hirschman, Rosenbluth, Pietra-Hoover (Ricci-Schutz) indices, and the coefficient 
of variation; these coefficients are not often encountered, but are of interest for the « diversity 
and concentration » questions (Allison, 1978), whence are introduced and compared with 
each other. They serve as a basis of discussion for the findings in the Conclusion section. 
 
For more completely defining the framework, focussing upon « money in sport », one 
should admit that the literature is of course huge (Neale, 1964; Szymanski, 2003). The same is 
true about ranking criteria, whence about RSLs (Ausloos and Cerqueti, 2016b; Reed, 2001). 
For completeness, let us recall that measures of concentration, in particular  their significance,  
have been also discussed at length in many papers  (Bikker and Haff, 2002; Marfels, 1972), 
while inequality indicators were well presented by Foldvary (2006). 
 
However the "numerical  intersection" of such sets seems to contain no element, 
thereby quite shortening a concise literature review on the true state of the art. Thus, in order 
to save space, and be very specific, the most relevant papers will be only mentioned in the 
Methodology (Section 2) and Data Analysis (Section 3) with an appropriate comment if 
necessary. 
In Section 4, one provides a discussion of the findings, in particular the breakdown of 
Pareto law. A set of conclusions is found in Section 5. Due to the delay in the peer review 
process, the 2019 RSL can be examined. It is displayed and  discussed in an Appendix. 
	
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Specificity of Professional Cyclism Sport Competition 
There are several ways to observe and to study financial concentration and RSLs in "self-
organized systems" within the sport competition realm.  First of all, one should divide the  
sport landscape  distinguishing "professionals"  from  "amateurs". The former case is 
considered here below. Next,  one may specify a certain type of sport and observe the 
activities through national or international sport leagues: sport leagues make teams and 
individuals mutually dependent for their existence and visibility. Within sport leagues, one 
can also distinguish different types of business. 
 
On the other hand, one can see sport as individual or team competitions.  A very 
interesting case, from many points of view, is when individual skills merge into a team result 
(Baumeister et al., 2016). This seems to be the case of almost all team competition in leagues, 
but holds a very specific feature in cycling races (Forster and Pope, 2004), because only one 
individual usually wins2, - in erroneously so called "individual races".  In fact, the winner  
often claims some help from his/her teammates; he/she often shares his/her financial gains 
with his/her teammates.  
  
Cycling competitions seem different from those in sports like football, rugby, (ice or 
not) hockey, water polo, etc., in which, from a team point of view, all partners seem to be 
equal. Salaries and  marketing contracts  of individuals much differ, of course. However in 
cycling competitions, the story is quite different3: "cycling is an individual sport practiced in 
team" (Forster and Pope, 2004; Rebeggiani and Tondani, 2006), - "neither a classical team 
sport, like basketball or football, nor a pure single sport, like tennis". There is a truly planned  
team strategy or activity in order to favorize one member,  who is the most likely intended 
winner in a race.  The 2018  year is  in fact very remarkable in that respect: due to such a  
strategy,  more than 70  "individual" races were won by a Quick-Step Floors rider, - 14 
different winners  out of a 28 men team. The subsequent questions arise: which team is 
wining the most money? How is the prize money distributed between teams? Can one expect 
some sort of "Pareto law phenomenon universality" to hold true?  
 
There will not be here any discussion on how much financial gains such a winner gets, 
or brings in the team common pot, nor whether the reward rules « make sense », but rather,  it 
is interesting to observe how much such a team globally obtains from the variously skilled 
teammates winning a race, - or receiving some bonus. Such a complex case is found in 
multistage competitions like the famous (male) bicycling races, Tour de France, Giro d'Italia, 
Vuelta, and nowadays much copied all over the world, by various organizers. 
 
In order to discuss gain inequality and team hierarchy, one can usefully calculate so 
called « concentration indices »: the entropy measure, the Theil entropy, the Gini coefficient, 
the Pietra index, the coefficient of variation, the Rosenbluth (Rosenbluth, 1955; Delalić et al., 
2018), and  first, the  Hirschman-Herfindahl  index. 
 
Rank-size law, Gains Concentration and Inequality Aspects 
A simple, i.e. power law, "rank-size law"  (RSL) can be derived from an  (approximated) 
analytical form presented by the variable, here the gain (gi),  ranked in descending order as a 
function of the (discrete) index i giving the "rank" of the team. The  "cumulative 
concentration distribution curve" (CCDC)  is 
  !!!!  𝑔!  	
 
When the CCDC  goes over an 80%  threshold, this defines the Pareto rank  rP. The Pareto’s 
law expects this rank rP  to be  equal to  N/5. 
       
For completeness, when recalling graphical displays,  let it be reminded that the 
Lorenz curve (LC) originally displays the proportion of  income  assumed by the % of the 
people, ranked from the poorest to the richest. By extension, LC is here the gain (in %) of the 
teams, ranked in increasing order 
𝑝!  =    𝑔!  /     ! !!!  𝑔!  	
 
Marfels (1972) distinguishes several types of concentration ratios, according to their 
weighting schemes and  their structure, which can be discrete or cumulative (Bikker and Haff, 
2002). Beside such ratios, inequality aspects are often discussed in order to tackle on social 
aspects  (Cowell, 1977). Different types of ratios are considered with different aims as 
explained below. 
       
A  standard measure  of (market) concentration (Matsumoto et al., 2012)  is the  
Hirschman-Herfindahl  index (HHI). 
 
HHI  =   (ΣiN g2i  ) / (ΣiN gi )2        (1) 
 
for N agents (teams, here)4. 
   
Information theory provides another concentration measure, emphasizing the "system 
disorder",  the entropy S = -  pi  ln (pi), in terms of pi , the proportion of the « size » (financial 
gain)   for the i-th team over the whole (gain) ensemble, as previously defined. Notice that 
HHI = ΣiN p2i . 
  
The Theil index  Th is	a	statistical	measure	of	economic	inequality	(Allison,	1978).  
Th is tied to the entropy:  Th = (1/N)  ΣiN ĝi ln (ĝi), where ĝi = gi /< gi> in which < gi> is the 
mean of the gain distribution, i.e. < gi> = (1/N) ΣiN gi. 
   
The coefficient of variation (CV) is a relative dispersion measure,  pointing to the 
dispersion (σ) around the mean (µ) of the distribution; CV =  σ / µ , expressed in percentage, 
it is somewhat hinting to inequalities. Even though, the skewness and kurtosis lead to a better 
description of the asymmetry and peakedness of a distribution, whence of inequalities, they 
are rarely discussed, whence are not further discussed here (Ausloos and Cerqueti, 2018). 
 
Closely related,  the Pietra inequality index (Frosini, 2012), also known as the Hoover 
index,  
 
     PHI = [ΣiN ( gi - < gi >)] / [2  ΣiN (gi)]       (2) 
 
indicates how the variable values should be distributed in order for them to create a perfect 
equality or minimal concentration.  
 
An indirect index is the Gini index,  Gi, one of the most often used inequality 
concentration measures. Derived from the LC, it is given by the ratio between the area 
enclosed by the LC and the diagonal (representing the equality  distribution) and the total area 
below this diagonal.  
 
Related to the Gini index, one has the Rosenbluth index (Rosenbluth, 1955) 
   
RI= 1 / [N(1-Gi)].        (3) 
      
  "Finally", the so called concentration coefficient   (CC) is  
      
        CC= N/[(N-1)  Gi].        (4) 		
 
3. DATA AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The data about the financial gains of the teams in the recent Tour de France years is 
aggregated from  various websites: 
 
http://www.portailduvelo.fr/tour-de-france-2015-les-gains-finaux-par-equipes/ 
http://www.portailduvelo.fr/tour-de-france-2016-les-gains-definitifs-des-equipes-en-fin-
depreuve/ 
http://www.portailduvelo.fr/tour-de-france-2017-les-gains-des-equipes/ 
 
and 
 
http://www.be-celt.com/2018/07/30/tour-de-france-les-gains-des-equipes-le-prix-de-la-
souffrance/ 
     
For a general information point of view, recall that the  (here, N=22)  competing teams 
are comprised of originally 9 riders, in the recent years  2018, 2017, 2016, and 2015; at the 
end of a day stage,  money prizes are attributed,  according to some pre-established rules,  to 
riders or even  to a team;   these gains are accumulated. Notice that  several teams (18)  are 
imposed by "Union Cycliste Internationale" (UCI) rules and a few  (4) are invited by the  
"Amaury Sport Organisation" (ASO) organizers. The  teams (and of course the riders) differ 
each year.  
 
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is of course trivial to rank the 22 teams according to their final gains at the end of 
the competition.   One  can observe on Fig. 1 that the RSL looks like a hyperbola. The most 
immediate analysis suggests  to obtain the curve characteristics through a fit to a  Zipf’s  law: 
 
s =  α  r - γ          (5) 
 
where α and γ are parameters to be calibrated for  each sample under investigation, and in the 
present case  s  is  gi. Through a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, the best fit to  Zipf's law 
leads to parameter values given in Table  1; the decay exponent γ is seen to be close to 1. 
 
PLEASE PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The  "cumulative concentration distribution curve" (CCDC)  of team financial gains in 
recent  Tour de France races is displayed in Fig. 2. From the latter, one obtains pi after 
normalization, and consequently the (almost necessarily non integer) rank value at which the 
Pareto 80% threshold  rP is reached. Such a value is given in Table  2.  It is obvious that rP > 
N/5 = 4.4.  
   
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
PLEASE PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The statistical characteristics of the  financial gains, as obtained, e.g.,  from Wessa 
(2018), are  given in Table 2. 
 
PLEASE PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The various concentration indices are given in Table 3. 
 
For visualization purpose,  Fig. 3  displays the yearly evolution of concentration and 
financial indices for the financial gains of bicycle teams in Tour de France in recent given 
years.  Such a graphic representation of the indices trends  demonstrates that they are 
mutually consistent.	
 4. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
 
A few  comments are in order. First,  it is easily  observed that the 2015 CCDC differs from 
the others; it has a smaller curvature; this seems to be due to the variation in the total money 
prize every year. Yet, notice the the prize money went much up in 2016, but is now going 
mildly down. The effect on γ and  rP is different. The former has a large dip in 2016, the  
latter has its weakest value in 2015. These differences will be further emphasized when 
discussing the financial indices. 
     
Second, from a  strictly numerical point of view, the  γ exponent (≈1)  is reminiscent 
of Zipf's finding about the "least effort law", also understood as an equilibrium process (Zipf,  
1949). However, more modernly, it can  be understood as  resulting from  a "self-organizing 
process" of complex systems, in fact, as recently discussed in a set of papers  about soccer 
team and country  ranking (Ausloos, 2014; Ausloos et al., 2014a, 2014b). The UEFA and 
FIFA ranking  rules lead to a dissipative structure process (Prigogine and Nicolis, 1967),  
which ends in a stable "dissipative structure" characterized by an "equilibrium exponent" ≈1. 
 
Third, the breakdown of Pareto law is unusual. The rule has been verified to hold  
elsewhere   in relation to sports ranking systems  (Deng et al., 2012).   It is  found that 20% of 
players possess approximately 80% of the scores or prize money of the whole system  in 
various sports (Deng et al., 2012).  However, this observation seems to  have been only  made 
for individual competitions, - and in presence of an exponential decay of the gain distribution 
at high rank. The present results  suggests to consider  further investigations on the matter.  
      
        Remarkably, this is different from a Matthew like effect, in which "the winner takes all".   
Let it be observed that cycling is a different matter: even though it seems that a cyclist race is 
won by only one individual, it is well known that this results from a team strategy and activity 
(Albert, 1991;   Hoenigman,  Bradley and  Lim, 2004)   as usually  recognized by the winner 
at interviews. 
 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is  usually applied to describe company  sizes (which 
measure the concentration) with respect to the entire market. Adapted  to the case of  financial 
gains of teams,  HHI is an interesting  indicator of the amount of competition.  From an 
industry competition point of view, a HHI index below 0.01 indicates a highly competitive 
index (from a portfolio point of view, a low HHI index implies a very diversified portfolio).  
The higher the value of HHI, the smaller the number of  teams with a large value of  gains or  
the weaker the competition. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index  ranges from 0.1432 (in 2015) 
down to 0.1128 (in 2016), - an about 25% drop, which is very large, but not easily seen on   
Fig. 3. Such a large HHI value suggests that no team highly dominates others, but competition 
becomes fiercer.  The so called Normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index, defined as  
 
HHI* =  [ (HHI - 1/N )] /[ 1-1/N ],       (6) 
 
varies from  ≈	0.1024 to  ≈0.0706; it presents the largest drop of the whole set of coefficients, 
between 2015 and 2016, that is ≈ 31 %. The  HHI* has also the largest growth rate, ≈	40% of 
all coefficients, after 2016. 
 
Entropy and hierarchy 
As it has already been understood, the entropy measure  should be negatively correlated to the 
concentration level. In other words, the closer the entropy value to 0, the higher the 
concentration, and the closer the entropy to its maximum ln(N) value, here  ln(22)=3.091, the 
lower the concentration. In 2015, the entropy measure is ≈	2.43 while in 2016 its value was ≈	
2.59, which indicates a slight decrease of concentration.  One easily calculates  (Max. Entropy 
- Entropy) and observes that this value presents a dip ≈ - 0.276, in 2016. Again,  it can be 
concluded that the financial gains  are "weakly concentrated".  
 
The same conclusion can be drawn based on the Theil entropy measure: in 2015, the 
Theil index is ≈ 0.66 and in 2016  falls to ≈  0.50,  and regrowths to  ≈ 0.60. Such data implies 
that there is a marked decrease in concentration at first, followed by a trend toward higher 
concentration, which can be understood on the basis of an increasing strength of the "best 
team" (SKY) in the  competition, as measured at the end of the race. 
         
The coefficient of variation  goes from ≈ 1.466 down to ≈	1.217,  later on going back 
up to  ≈1.438. The decay rate ≈	- 17 %  is more recently followed by a ≈+18 % growth rate. 
 
Based on these values, it can be said that the coefficient of variation is the more 
volatile measure  (it  can be deduced from Table 2 that CV has the largest standard deviation) 
of all the measures used in the research for the analysed period. 
     
As it has been defined earlier, a high coefficient of variation implies a great dispersion 
around the mean. In the present case, the CV is not very large, ≈1,  interestingly pointing, as 
also the high kurtosis value does, see Table 2, to a  quite peaked distribution near the mean.  
For completeness, the skewness value points to a long upper tail (in a continuum 
approximation), again  indicating the "financial gain superiority" of  the "best team" and a 
weak  concentration system. 
 
Pietra-Hoover, Gini wealth inequality distribution 
The Pietra-Hoover inequality index  (PHI) is a peculiar measure (Delalić,	 et	 al.,	 2018) 
indicating the proportion of the total variable value which should be transferred from the 
value area above the arithmetic mean to the value area below the arithmetic mean such that a 
uniform distribution can be achieved.  The value of this index can be found from the Lorenz 
curve: the value is obtained from the greatest "vertical distance" between the Lorenz curve 
and the uniform distribution line. High values of the index obviously represent a high 
inequality level since a greater redistribution of values is required in order to achieve equality; 
vice-versa, lower values of the index represent a lower inequality level. In the present case, 
PHI goes from ≈	0.455 down to ≈0.400 and  slowly back up to ≈	0.410, thus with respective  ≈	 -0.12  and ≈	0.023 rates. This indicates that the "financial ranking" of teams is in a quasi 
steady state, - there is no money redistribution over the years, confirming the observation  of 
quasi equilibrium, seen from the RSL. 
 
Recall that in contrast to the PHI, Gi measures a ratio between  surfaces. The values of 
the Gini coefficient range from 0.58 to 0.52, the dip here occurring in 2017.  These rather low 
values  indicate a rather low concentration. Only a subjective conclusion can be reached from 
the near 0.5 value: the gain distribution is not too uniform  but not far from uniform, - in a 
statistical sense!  
 
Financial Concentration 
In contrast to Gi, which measures "inequality", the Rosenbluth Index is more related to a 
concentration measure. Besides, in contrast to the HHI which emphasizes the role of the best 
teams (at low ranks), RI emphasizes the role of the "worst teams". The low RI values (near ≈	
0.10) indicate that the "worst teams" are almost all equal. This is indeed in agreement with the 
long « flat tail », that is, the exponent of the RSL.   
   
Moreover, based on the Rosenbluth Index values,  found in Table 3, it can be said that 
the  RI  is the less volatile, when the presently  less sensitive,  measure: it has the lowest 
standard deviation ≈	 0.0062, lower than the HHI (≈	 0.013) or HHI* (≈	 0.014), of all the 
measures used in this  research for the investigated races.   Notice that  like Gi,  the largest RI 
dip occurs in 2017.  
 
Finally,  based on the data presented in Table 3 and Fig. 3, it can be concluded that the  
"gain concentration " had been  slightly  decreasing with a  (≈	0.109) rate  until 2017, but has 
grown again in 2018, with a ≈	0.065 rate.  
   
Notice that the Squared Coefficient of Variation and the Normalised Herfindahl-
Hirschman index,  the  Max. Entropy – Entropy  and the Theil  Index,  as well as  the Gini and 
concentration index, are pairs of indices which these have necessarily the same relative  decay  
or growth rate values.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Several questions have been considered in this research. First, the "behavior" of the financial 
gains of teams in recent (male) TdFs is investigated. It is searched whether there is a scaling 
law as often found in other socio-economic cases. It is found that such a RSL exists and is 
characterized by a simple exponent reminding of the occurrence of a steady state in 
dissipative structure, - whatever the year of the race.  However, the Pareto sparsity law is not 
obeyed: 80 % of the financial prizes are distributed in many more than the 4 best  teams as 
should be theoretically expected if the Pareto's law holds true. In so doing, it is  understood 
that  the financial gain distribution at the end of the race is very particular. The official 
distribution rules are such that the financial gain by a team is a complex sum of inputs by the 
various riders. The Pareto's law breakdown might be due to this musketeer-like aspect of  
such  long races: "one for all, all for one". 
     
    In the subsequent analysis, we have searched for various financial indices in order to 
answer a question about the evolution of the concentration of gains. Indeed, it is commonly 
accepted that several teams are better than others and would gain more money than others at 
the end of the race.  Contrary to expectations, it is found that the financial concentration, as 
discussed in financial studies, is not strong  at all. An explanatory  conjecture stems from 
what is also "common expectation by observers": several teams might join together at some 
time and for short period of time, a couple of stages, in order to impede a too easy win by the 
"best rider" in a commonly admitted favourite team (Albert, 1991; Hoenigman et al., 2016).  
By extension, this brings some impetus to research on whether people perform better in 
groups only “when members of the group are individually identified and responsible” and 
conversely,  whether people perform worse in groups when they “are not publicly identified 
or rewarded” (Baumeister et al. 2016;  Zhang et al., 2018).  In other words,  how individual  
responsibility, obligingness,  and skill contribute  to group success.  
     
    Within this framework, 8 financial indices connected to the question of the concentration 
have been tested and compared with each other in order to put into evidence their respective 
meaning concerning the various parts of the gain distribution, in relation to team ranking. 
     
    In conclusion, let it be emphasized that the report presents a rare type of data, with some 
"universality feature potential". Several features are rather unexpected, - even confronting the 
sporting common fan expectations. A posteriori, those might be understood if one reconsiders 
the gain distribution rules and the riders (or teams) strategies. At this time, there is no 
theoretical explanation of the value of the RSL exponent. Let it be observed, through the 2019 
results, see Appendix, that a « king effect » (Laherrere and Sornette, 1998) markedly exists, 
without a « vice-roy effect » (Cerqueti and Ausloos, 2015 ; Ausloos and Cerqueti, 2016a).  
Notice also that the decay parameter for (and from) the exponential fit can be hardly guessed 
in advance.   
Alas, a complex model is out of the aim of this report and findings, yet these are 
suggesting to look at such similar data in other equivalent types of races, including related 
female team competitions, and maybe in other sports in which the team ranking derives from 
different inputs by the teammates. An opened question, but data has to be made available by 
organizers, is whether prize money distribution rules in different sportively similar races lead 
to observe universal features, and if not, why they vary. We like to think that financial gains 
measure performance, but do they ? 
  
APPENDIX 
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The 2019 Tour de France case 
 
Due to the delay in the peer review process, the 2019 Tour de France gains are now 
available. Thus the RSL may be examined results can be examined. The pertinent display is 
found in Fig. 4.  A power law fir leads to the value of the exponent : -1.2, similar to that found 
for the previous years.  
In so doing, it can be pointed out here that the exponent seems to be mainly 
originating from the so called « king effect »  (Laherrere and Sornette, 1998); the tail of the 
RSL rather looks like an exponential. Inded, if one arbitrarily removes the 1st team gains, a 
better fit than the power law is the exponential. The decay  parameter is about equal to 7.58. 
Notice that the vice-roy effect (Cerqueti and Ausloos, 2015; Ausloos and Cerqueti, 2016a) 
seems very weak. 
 
 
  
Endnotes 
 
1	The 80–20  "Pareto rule" states  (Pareto and Page, 1971) that, in many cases, roughly 80% 
of the effects come from 20% of the cause. 
2 There are  team competitions, like in "against the clock" or "team time trial" races. 	
3 Professional cycling is one of the oldest professional sports (Desbordes, 2006, 2008). 
4 In classical finance studies, the upper limit of the sum in Eq. (1) is conventionally limited to 
the supposedly most important (up to 30) firms on the market, but there is no criticism to 
provide if Eq. (1)  used if N<30.  
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Fig. 1 Rank (r)-size (s) law of financial gains in EUR for bicycle teams in Tour de France in 
given years. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2 Cumulative concentration distribution curve of financial gains  in million euros for 
bicycle teams in Tour de France in given years. The inset gives the power law exponent 
(obtained through a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm) and the  R2 value of the fit. 	 	
		Fig.	3	Yearly evolution of concentration and financial indices for the financial gains of bicycle 
teams in Tour de France in recent given years.		
Fig. 4 Rank (r)-size (s) law of financial gains in EUR for bicycle teams having competed  in 
2019 Tour de France. One may distinguish a « king effect ». 
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year α x 10(-5) γ R2 rP 
     
2015 6.00+/-0.35 1.03+/-0.07 0.933 8.65 
2016 5.90+/-0.19 0.95+/-0.03 0.978 9.35 
2017 6.92 +/-0.21 1.13+/-0.04 0.980 10.34 
2018 7.05 +/-0.21 1.14+/-0.04 0.981 9.2 
 
 
Table 1. Best-fit parameters of the Zipf’s law, Eq(5). The  standard error at 95% for the two 
parameters are reported  with the subsequent R2 ; the "Pareto rank" rP is given (see text for 
definition). 
 
year Min. Max. Total Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
        
2018 14 420 728 630 2 272 250 1.033 1.5208 3.3720 11.339 
2017 19 230 716 590 2 287 650 1.040 1.4820 3.4367 11.638 
2016 14 100 599 240 2 295 850 1.044 1.3002 2.7072 7.6602 
2015 10 940 556 630 2 027 650 0.922 1.3833 2.5755 5.4239 
 
 
Table 2.  Statistical characteristics of the financial gain distributions of the 22 teams  at the 
end of the Tour de France for given race years; Min. , Max. , and Total are in EUR; Mean and 
Std. Dev.  are in 105 EUR. 
  
 
 
 
year 2015 2016 2017 2018 
     
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 0.14319 0.11281 0.13359 0.13948 
Entropy 2.42815 2.58900 2.54552 2.49462 
Theil Index 0.66290 0.50204 0.54553 0.59642 
Coefficient of Variation 1.46638 1.21728 1.39244 1.43826 
Pietra-Hoover Index 0.45496 0.40030 0.39612 0.40948 
Gini Index 0.58079 0.52707 0.51757 0.55123 
Rosenbluth Index 0.10843 0.09611 0.09422 0.10129 
Concentration Index 0.60845 0.55217 0.54222 0.57748 
  
 
Table 3. Financial inequality and concentration measure indices for the  22 cycling team 
financial gain distributions at the end of the Tour de France in given years. 
 
